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Abstract
In moving towards highly connected integrated systems, the
Industrial Internet of Thing (IIoT) promises a wealth of ben-
efits. Enhanced usage of existing data sources, and integra-
tion of additional generation points, provide system users with
greater visibility of industrial processes. This visibility can be
used to identify and address inefficiencies. Within the con-
text of discrete manufacturing, examples include reduction of
waste materials and energy consumption. However, while one
becomes engrossed in the use of big-data analytics, cloud tech-
nologies, and seamless adoption through hardware gateways,
decade old systems are dropped into a technological melting
pot of modern IoT, with little consideration of additional cy-
ber security risks. Numerous works have provided evidence
to suggest industrial systems are highly vulnerable to cyber
attacks, from both a device and communication protocol per-
spective, yet efforts to automatically identify vulnerabilities
are limited. This presents a significant gap, with vulnerabil-
ity exploitation harbouring potentially life-threatening impact.
Here we address this gap through the development of PIVoT
Scan, an industrially-aware vulnerability scanner, capable of
assessing a diverse range of devices and communication pro-
tocols predominantly situated within the legacy layers of IIoT
environments — “The forgotten I”. Furthermore, we demon-
strate PIVoT Scan’s ability to outperform a leading vulnerabil-
ity scanner, Nessus.
1 Introduction
Over recent years we have seen a shift in technological offer-
ings for use within Industrial Control Systems (ICSs), branded
under the term Industrial Internet of Things (IIoT). These
promise a wealth of benefits through seamless integration with
existing systems. However, should one consider the vulner-
able state of existing systems, and the critical functions they
provide, the additional cyber security risks that manifest from
such high connectivity may dampen this enthusiasm.
ICSs are highly complex socio-technical environments,
offering monitoring, control, and automation functions across
a variety of sectors. These include water, gas, oil, nuclear,
etc. some of which can be considered critical national
infrastructure [1]. Security challenges harboured by legacy
components have been well-documented, with real-world
attacks acting as an additional evidence base. Historic targets
have included a uranium enrichment plant [2], energy distri-
butions networks [3, 4], and a steel mill [5]. Legacy devices
including Programmable Logic Controllers (PLCs) and Re-
mote Terminal Units (RTUs), alongside IIoT data acquisition
gateways, present an attractive attack surface. The use of
legacy communication protocols, including Modbus/TCP,
Ethernet/IP, DNP3, and OPC DA, further compounds the
challenges, as there was little consideration for cyber security
during their conception.
The integration of IIoT into traditional ICSs is blurring the
boundaries as to what constitutes either system. As adoption
of IIoT increases, there must be adequate consideration of se-
curity vulnerabilities that comprise the legacy layers of IIoT
environments, the forgotten I. Figure 1 depicts a typical de-
ployment of IIoT alongside legacy ICSs. Here we see PLCs
and RTUs residing on the same local IP network as IIoT gate-
ways, one of which is directly polling PLCs for operational
data. This same gateway is then communicating with two IIoT
analytic platforms via a public communication medium (i.e.
the internet).
Such interaction with legacy ICS devices is often required in
the deployment of IIoT. Furthermore, once data is aggregated
at a local-level, its value can only be seen in its application
to remote, often cloud-based, analytic platforms. In search
of an affordable approach to its transit, public networks can
be employed. This, alongside unrestricted interactions with
legacy devices, presents a significant problem from a security
perspective. However to fully realise the level of risk posed,
one must be able to identify device and communication-level
vulnerabilities across a wide range of legacy systems.
Currently, such vulnerability analysis is limited due to a lack
of industrially-aware vulnerability scanners. Existing ap-
proaches and tools are based on retrofitting traditional IT vul-
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Fig. 1: A typical IIoT environment – Legacy and non-legacy devices, protocols and services
nerability scanners to an industrial context. This results in an
inability to comprehensively identify vulnerabilities in legacy
systems. Their effectiveness is further limited by the inher-
ent heterogeneity of legacy components integrated within IIoT.
While identification of vulnerabilities across a range of con-
temporary IIoT devices is important, extension towards afore-
mentioned legacy systems, including both devices and network
protocols, is critical.
In this paper we address these two fundamental challenges: the
need for industrially-aware vulnerability scanners and effec-
tive support for the heterogeneous devices and protocols preva-
lent in IIoT. We present PIVoT Scan (Producing awareness of
the Industrial-Vulnerable of Things), a vulnerability scanner
tailored to the discovery of vulnerabilities in IIoT including
the legacy devices integrated therein. Unlike existing scanners
that simply enumerate devices, PIVoT Scan maps device in-
formation to industrial protocols, making it industrially-aware
– including support for a range of heterogeneous devices and
protocols. Our evaluation in a real-world IIoT testbed demon-
strates PIVoT Scan’s ability to outperform the leading commer-
cial vulnerability scanner, Nessus. This is especially true when
considering industrial protocols, a feature not yet present in
commercial offerings. PIVoT Scan’s ability to uncover vulner-
abilities previously unknown to system owners and operators,
offers a highly valuable tool, especially where infrastructure-
wide IIoT adoption is under way.
2 Limitations of current vulnerability scanners
The market leader for commercial vulnerability scanners is
Nessus. Though initially designed for scanning generic IT
infrastructures, a number of plugins are available to scan for
vulnerabilities in industrial devices, for example PLCs, RTUs
and data acquisition gateways that are typical of IIoT environ-
ments. However, this broad approach in vulnerability scanning
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impacts effectiveness, especially when deployed over a com-
plex network consisting of a multitude of device types – some-
thing that is very much characteristic of IIoT. Prior research [6]
has demonstrated that, while Nessus can uncover a number of
generic IT vulnerabilities such as default credentials, insecure
SSH and weak configuration of services, the coverage of spe-
cific vulnerabilities that are unique to IIoT is highly limited.
Such studies demonstrate the need for industrially-aware vul-
nerability scanners that account for the specificities of legacy
devices and protocols that make up a significant portion of IIoT
environments.
A number of lightweight port scanners have been developed
for IIoT protocols, including PLCScan [7] that can enumer-
ate the Modbus/TCP and S7 protocols, the enip-info Nmap
script [8] to enumerate the EtherNet/IP protocol and the dnp3-
info Nmap script [9] to enumerate the DNP3 protocol. Even
though these port scanners/scripts do provide pertinent infor-
mation as output, e.g., firmware version number, they do not
provide any information on vulnerabilities or security issues
associated with a device or protocol.
In our earlier work [10], we developed the SimaticScan vul-
nerability scanner, specifically tailored for Siemens PLCs and
the S7 protocol. However, the scanner is limited to Siemens
devices only and does not address the heterogeneity of devices
and protocols typical of IIoT settings.
In contrast with existing works, PIVOT Scan is:
• industrially-aware, i.e, tailored towards finding vul-
nerabilities in IIoT devices, including legacy ICS de-
vices and legacy industrial protocols;
• accounts for the inherent heterogeneity of IIoT
settings and supports active verification of vulnera-
bilities.
3 PIVoT Scan
The system architecture of PIVoT Scan is shown in Figure 2.
The modular design allows users to choose which devices and
protocols they want to scan, with the default option scanning
all devices and protocols based on the IP addresses of devices
provided as input. All modules run in parallel to each other
and the modular design allows a user to select which module
to run, for example, a user can scan a device for just protocol
vulnerabilities. A modular architecture also makes it possible
to easily integrate support for additional (new or legacy) de-
vices and protocols as required.
The Device Enumeration and Protocol Vulnerabilities modules
address the industrial-awareness need. The Enumeration mod-
ule does not only output pertinent vulnerabilities of industrial
devices but is also used as a basis to determine which CVEs
to retrieve and which industrial protocols to verify. For exam-
ple, should a PLC have an EtherNet/IP port open, PIVoT Scan
identifies which vulnerabilities exist on the device based on its
firmware version number and goes further than other vulnera-
bility scanners in providing vulnerability information that sits
outside the confines of a CVE entry, such as links to exploits
and security advisories. This same kind of knowledge is then
used to scan for protocol vulnerabilities, correlating the type of
device and type of protocol.
The Device Vulnerabilities and Web Server Vulnerabilities
modules address the hetereogeneity requirement – supporting
vulnerability scanning for not only contemporary IIoT devices
but also legacy industrial devices.
An Industrially-aware Scanner
Device enumeration. Based on the devices under test,
using existing Nmap scripts, PIVoT Scan retrieves device
information such as type of PLC, vendor, serial number,
etc. This device information is used to determine which
protocol to scan. The firmware version of a device is also
retrieved and compared to vendor-specific Common Platform
Enumeration (CPE) terms, a naming scheme for software,
operating systems and hardware. The vFeed API [11] is
used to compare the retrieved firmware version numbers with
vFeed’s search functionality. If the firmware of a device is
less than or equal to a vendor’s CPE, then it is likely that a
vulnerability exists, as CVEs are correlated to CPEs. CVE
information is then communicated to the user. In contrast
with existing scanners, which only output relevant CVE
information, PIVoT Scan is much more contextual in that it
establishes information on any Metasploit modules or exploits
that are available for a particular CVE, as well as any relevant
security advisories from the Industrial Control Systems Cyber
Emergency Response Team (ICS-CERT).
Protocol vulnerabilities. IIoT supervision networks often
rely on insecure legacy protocols to pull data from devices
in the production network, specifically, Modbus/TCP, Ether-
Net/IP and DNP3. Consequently, we aim to ascertain potential
protocol vulnerabilities associated with a device:
Verify Man-in-the-middle (MITM) vulnerability: A serious
vulnerability that affects most industrial protocols is that of a
MITM vulnerability. An attacker can leverage this to snoop
on traffic and issue malicious write requests to devices that
would result in false information being sent to services in the
supervision network. PIVoT Scan verifies this vulnerability
by attempting to ARP-spoof sessions between devices in the
production network and the services that pull control process
data in the supervision network. If PIVoT Scan can sniff
packets between entities than this functionality is indicative of
a MITM vulnerability and can also be used in verifying the
presence of cleartext data.
Verify cleartext data: Another well-known vulnerability of
industrial protocols is that sensitive control process data is
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Fig. 2: PIVoT Scan System Architecture
unencrypted as it passes between devices and services. An
attacker can make use of this and determine how devices
operate by obtaining cleartext control process data and using
this data as further basis for an attack, such as maliciously
overwriting control process data. PIVoT Scan parses industrial
protocol network layers at the same time as performing a
MITM attack. It then traverses a protocol’s application layer
to identify cleartext packets.
Verify read/write access: Legacy, industrial protocols also suf-
fer from a complete lack of authentication, which would al-
low attackers to issue read requests and write requests to de-
vices/services. The pymodbus library for Modbus/TCP de-
vices and the pycomm library for EtherNet/IP devices are used
to issue read requests to devices that use these protocols. Any
responses from read requests indicate that an attacker can di-
rectly read and/or write to and from legacy ICS devices and
obtain data on critical control processes. Write requests are,
as a conscious design choice, not supported as these have the
potential to cause damage to physical control processes.
Support for Device Heterogeneity
Device vulnerabilities. PIVoT Scan supports verification of
the susceptibility of a range of devices to a number of vulnera-
bilities. This includes scanning for:
• vulnerabilities in the SSL/TLS implementation, such as
weak ciphers (e.g., inadequate bit length, weak protocol
implementation and weak certificate signatures);
• vulnerable ports, probing open ports and cleartext com-
munication or weak authentication for protocols such Tel-
net and FTP as well as for insecure versions of protocols
such as SNMP;
• credential scanning for default keys, for instance, for IIoT
data acquisition gateways, such as WirelessHART gate-
ways.
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Web server vulnerabilities. Several legacy ICS devices have
built in web interfaces, allowing for remote monitoring and
control. PIVoT Scan verifies the presence of such vulnerabili-
ties:
Verify session fixation/session IDs: Devices that are en-
cumbered with insecure methods of generating session IDs
are tested. Attackers may conduct fixation attacks to gain
access to user accounts or session hijacking attacks to gain
unauthorised access to the gateway’s web server. PIVoT Scan
tests for this vulnerability by parsing, for instance, the URL of
the WirelessHART gateway and determining if the login page
has a static session ID.
Verify cross-site request forgery (CSRF): Associated with
the session fixation/session ID vulnerability is the possi-
bility of an attacker conducting a CSRF attack whereby
the attacker can use the session ID to carry out malicious
commands that are, in fact, carried out by a victim’s browser.
PIVoT Scan tests if the forms on the web server lack an
unpredictable token for each user. Without a token, an at-
tacker can forge malicious requests and is further aided in such
attempts through the use of static server-generated session IDs.
Verify Denial-of-Service (DoS): This optional module offers
the possibility to conduct a DoS attack on integrated web
servers. Since the test could be seriously disruptive on any
production system, the functionality is kept optional. When
the option is enabled, PIVoT Scan performs a slowloris DoS
attack to test for this vulnerability. A slowloris DoS attack is
a type of DoS over the HTTP protocol, where a multitude of
connections are established. These connections send long term
requests which would consume a web server’s connection
pool. Eventually the web server will not be able to connect to
other entities (i.e. an authorised user of the web server) until
these held connections are released.
Check for sensitive data: Some PLCs have web servers that
display sensitive control process and device information data
without the need for user authentication. Any leakage of
sensitive information would allow an attacker to build up a
knowledge base of how a PLC works and should be kept
confidential. PIVoT Scan tests for these vulnerabilities by
probing the web server of a PLC and determining if it can read
sensitive data such as internal PLC diagnostics.
Read control process data: Specific PLCs may have web
pages open that leak sensitive control process data that should
be kept confidential. An attacker can browse to this page, con-
duct an analysis of what the PLC is measuring and access data
tags and values from this page without authenticating. PIVoT
Scan determines if vulnerable web pages are open and attempts
to pull data associated with control process data, such as mea-
surements of a PLC’s input and output interfaces.
4 Evaluation
We evaluated PIVoT Scan in a real-world testbed environment
at Lancaster University, contrasting it with the leading vulner-
ability scanner, Nessus. The Lancaster testbed implements the
abstract view of an IIoT environment shown earlier in Fig-
ure 1. This IIoT implementation forms part of a larger envi-
ronment [12, 13]. The testbed covers a range of popular ven-
dors and technologies, from both legacy and modern aspects
of IIoT, hence offering a diverse and realistic lab-based envi-
ronment.
At a device level, four Allen-Bradley PLCs, one Schneider
RTU, one Siemens WirelessHART Gateway, and one Digi Zig-
bee Gateway, were configured for use on a local IP network.
For reference, we selected four Allen-Bradley PLCs to repre-
sent a wider range and age of similar devices.
From a software perspective, Schneider’s Wonderware, and
PTC’s Kepware and Thingworx were selected. This reflects
real-world local (Kepware) and remote (Thingworx and Won-
derware) data aggregation/analysis. While these are not di-
rectly included within our evaluation, they allow relevant con-
nections to be established between our selection of devices, in
the same way as if applied to a live environment.
Both PIVoT Scan and Nessus were used on the same configu-
ration of the testbed and all identified vulnerabilities manually
verified. The comparison is based on Nessus 6.10.8, the latest
version of Nessus in August 2017 (when the experiments were
conducted).
PIVoT Scan. As shown in Figure 3 PIVoT Scan identified a
wide range of vulnerabilities across the devices/protocols in
the testbed. In particular, most of the PLCs under test had rele-
vant CVEs returned, with the ControlLogix and CompactLogix
subject to 8 publicly-known vulnerabilities and 4 Metasploit
modules. Almost all of the devices were running vulnerable
ports, such as unencrypted Telnet and FTP ports and an in-
secure configuration of the SNMP protocol. Weak SSL/TLS
issues were found across both IIoT gateways and one specific
gateway was using default join keys.
The most serious web server vulnerabilities were found on the
WirelessHART gateway, where it was subject to session fixa-
tion, CSRF and DoS vulnerabilities. The PLCs under test were
leaking sensitive information from their integrated web servers
and one PLC was vulnerable to a direct read of control process
data via its integrated web server.
All three protocols were successfully tested. PIVOT Scan
verified MITM vulnerabilities and extracted cleartext data
from the Modbus/TCP-enabled WirelessHART gateway, as
well as directly issuing unauthorised read requests. The same
vulnerabilities were verified against the EtherNet/IP-enabled
Micro 820 PLC and the SLC5/05 PLC as these were subject
to unauthorised read requests. Successful spoofing of data via
MITM and the attainment of cleartext data was also shown to
be a vulnerability of the DNP3-enabled RTU.
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Fig. 3: PIVoT Scan results
Nessus. Figure 4 shows the results of the Nessus scans super-
imposed on the PIVoT Scan results in Figure 3. The red crosses
indicate a vulnerability that was verified by PIVoT Scan but not
by Nessus. The rightmost columns show the additional vulner-
abilities that Nessus verified but PIVoT Scan did not.
The results show that Nessus did return a large number of
vulnerabilities associated with device enumeration and the
issues of weak SSL/TLS and vulnerable ports. It was also able
to issue unauthorised read requests over Modbus/TCP to the
WirelessHART gateway. The Nessus scan also additionally
found an SNMP DDoS vulnerability for the ZigBee gateway,
an IP forwarding vulnerability for both CompactLogix and
ControlLogix PLCs and an FTP port bounce vulnerability for
the Schneider RTU.
Comparing PIVoT Scan and Nessus results. Though both
PIVoT Scan and Nessus were able to return device information
for the PLCs, Nessus was unable to retrieve any CVEs associ-
ated with the PLCs. While both scanners were adept at finding
SSL/TLS vulnerabilities and unsecured ports, the default join
key vulnerability, a specific IIoT vulnerability, was not verified
by Nessus.
Nessus was unable to determine the vulnerabilities of the Wire-
lessHART gateway’s web server and was only capable of deter-
mining that HTTP services were running. Similarly, with the
PLCs, Nessus did not infer that the information on the PLC’s
web server was of a sensitive nature. In contrast PIVoT Scan
could not only verify the aforementioned vulnerabilities but
also directly read control process data from a table that was
residing in the SLC5/05’s web server.
PIVoT Scan was a lot more effective in determining the vul-
nerabilities of industrial protocols than Nessus. For instance,
although Nessus was able to check for unauthorised read/write
access over the Modbus/TCP protocol, it could only read data
from two locations associated with the device, whereas PIVoT
Scan was able to read data from four locations. The Mod-
bus/TCP protocol was also tested by PIVoT Scan for a MITM
vulnerability, which verified that the protocol was communi-
cating in cleartext and could be easily spoofed. For the Ether-
Net/IP protocol, PIVoT Scan was able to verify both MITM
and cleartext data vulnerabilities for the Micro820 PLC, as
well as directly verifying the unauthorised read/write access
vulnerability. In contrast, Nessus incorrectly identified read
vulnerability of Modbus/TCP data from the Micro820 PLC,
which was manually verified to be not the case. For the DNP3
protocol, again Nessus was not able to determine a MITM vul-
nerability and/or the issue of having control process data as
cleartext from the Schneider RTU and was unable to determine
that the DNP3 protocol was running at all.
However, the Nessus scan did return vulnerabilities that PIVoT
Scan did not. A SNMP reflection DDoS vulnerability was ver-
ified that would give attackers the ability to conduct a reflec-
tive DDoS attack over the Zigbee gateway. Two of the PLCs
were liable to IP forwarding vulnerabilities where an attacker
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Fig. 4: Nessus scan results
can route packets through the host and the Schneider RTU was
liable to an FTP port bounce vulnerability, where attackers
could use the remote server to connect to third parties using
the PORT command.
5 Conclusion
The wide range of vulnerabilities that PIVoT Scan success-
fully evaluated shows how the complexity and heterogeneity
of IIoT environments leads to security vulnerabilities. The use
of insecure, legacy protocols will remain an issue for some
time. However, asset owners and control systems engineers
can tailor defensive measures for these protocols based on
industrially-aware vulnerability scanning tools.
Our comparison of PIVoT Scan and Nessus demonstrates the
importance and effectiveness of such industrially-aware scan-
ners, especially with respect to legacy devices and protocols
integrated into IIoT enviroments. Although much work has
been done on contemporary devices and protocols, the legacy
issue of IIoT still requires scrutiny and practical tools such as
PIVoT Scan can help in uncovering vulnerabilities and driving
innovation in developing defensive tools and frameworks.
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